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Senator Johnston's Proposals for Regulatory
Reform: New Cost-Benefit-Risk Analysis
Requirements for EPA?*
Linda-Jo Schierow**

Introduction
Every administration since President Nixon's in 1983 has, by
executive order, required agencies to analyze the costs, benefits and
risks of regulations prior to promulgation. President Clinton also
supports cost-benefit and risk analysis, as demonstrated by his E.O.
12866 on Regulatory Planning and Review, 1 said to extend and build
upon earlier orders. Yet, the Administration generally has opposed
legislation to codify such requirements in law because, if a legislative
mandate is too specific or prescriptive, it might halt the evolution of
risk assessment methodologies and impinge on executive
responsibilities. In any event, legislation requiring risk analysis of
proposed regulations is unnecessary, the Administration contends,
because it is required by executive order.
Some Representatives nonetheless believe legislation is desirable
because executive orders may be altered or revoked as President
Clinton revoked President Reagan's Executive Orders. Also, some
members of Congress are skeptical about the details of E.O. 12866 and
questioning whether it is indeed similar to those replaced.
The 103d Congress (1993-1994) was a turning point for
environmental policy: It was the first in which virtually every
Representative and Senator discussed environmental risk analysis, and
many debated its utility for risk management. This arose from
* The views expressed in this paper are the author's own and do not necessarily
represent those of the Congressional Research Service.

** Dr. Schierow is an Analyst in Environmental Policy in the Environment and
Natural Resources Division of the Congressional Research Service, Library of
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persistent demands by Senators Bennett Johnston (D-LA) and Daniel
Patrick Moynihan (D-NY) and a loose coalition of Representatives,
generally characterized by the media as relatively conservative
Democrats and moderate Republicans.
The Senate acted first, adopting 95 to 3, an amendment offered by
Senator Johnston to S. 171, a bill to raise the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to department (cabinet) status. 2 The
lopsided vote on the amendment was attributed by some to the Senate
popularity of any provision to force EPA to more carefully consider
ways to reduce the burden on industry, states and local governments.
Senate passage encouraged House proponents of environmental risk
analysis who introduced similar bills. At least one enthusiastic supporter
announced that no environmental bill would be enacted until there was
open debate on the House floor and a vote on a mandate to EPA to
publish a risk estimate for each regulation.
As discussed in an earlier article, several risk provisions were
reported out of committees, and one was enacted in 1994. 3 The
House Republican Contract with America promises that, within the
first 100 days of the 104th Congress, risk legislation will be introduced,
debated and voted upon. Title III of the "Job Creation and Wage
Enhancement Act of 1995" (H.R. 9), introduced January 4, 1995,
contains a slightly modified version of the original Johnston
Amendment, with coverage expanded to include all federal agencies
that promulgate health, safety and environmental regulations.
Also Title VII of H.R. 9 would codify most of President Reagan's
E.O. 12291 and significantly expand the requirements for Regulatory
Impact Analysis, while defining a "major" rule as affecting more than
100 persons or requiring any person to spend more than $1M to
comply. Senator Glenn reintroduced most of Senator Johnston's
language in S. 100.
Thus, anyone interested in risk regulation should be interested in
key provisions, particularly the original Johnston amendment,
considered in the 103d Congress. This paper summarizes that and the
2 Apr. 29, 1993.
3 Linda-Jo Schierow, Comparison of Environmental Risk Provisions in the 103d
Congress, 5 Risk 283 (1994).
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revised Johnston amendment to S. 2019 which also passed the Senate
and compares them to the provisions in several executive orders.
Major Provisions Compared
Before summarizing similarities and differences for cost-benefit and
risk analysis among requirements of the two Johnston amendments and
executive orders of the Reagan and Clinton Administrations, it should
be noted that none of these supersede statutory requirements, e.g., in
the Clean Air Act, with regard to how EPA should weigh costs and
risks in developing regulations. Executive orders never supersede
statutes, and the amendments explicitly stated otherwise.
Johnston Amendment to S. 171
The original amendment would have required EPA, when
promulgating any final regulation relating to human health and safety
4
or the environment, to publish in the Federal Register:
(1) an estimate of the risk to public health and safety
addressed by the regulation and its effect on human health
or the environment and the costs associated with
implementation of, and compliance with, the regulation;
(2) a comparative analysis of the risk addressed by the
regulation relative to other risks to which the public is
exposed;
(3) the Secretary's certification that:
(A) the estimate and analysis are based upon a scientific
evaluation of the risk and are supported by the best available
scientific data;
(B) the regulation will substantially advance the purpose
of protecting the human health and safety or the
environment against the specified identified risk; and
(C) the regulation will produce benefits to human health
and safety or the environment that will justify the
implementation and compliance costs.
If the Secretary could not certify, a report to Congress would have
been required as well as a statement of reasons in the final regulation.
Also, the certification would not modify any statutes or be subject to
judicial review. Finally, it was provided that "nothing in this section
shall be construed to grant a cause of action to any person."
4

Senate-passed S. 171 § 123.
6 Risk: Health, Safety & Environment 1 [Winter 1995]

Several undefined terms and phrases complicate evaluation and
comparison. For example, S. 171, as passed, §123 called for "an
estimate, performed with as much specificity as practicable." Is that a
single number, a range of numbers, a detailed quantitative description
of the relationship between risks and costs or simply a judgment about
the value of a regulation? Because the debate surrounding the
amendment seemed to assume that it required quantitative analyses, a
similar assumption is adopted here. Based on this interpretation, the
original amendment's requirement to estimate risks and costs of
environmental regulations seems similar to requirements for analyses
under President Reagan's executive orders discussed below. 5 An
important difference between the amendment to S. 171 and other
documents discussed, however, is that the original amendment would
have applied to every final EPA regulation, regardless of significance,
whereas the revised amendment and the executive orders apply only to
major or significant regulations.
Johnston Amendment to S. 2019
The amendment to S. 20196 would have required EPA, when
promulgating any proposed or final major regulation relating to human
health or the environment, to publish in the Federal Register a clear and
concise statement that:
(1) describes and, to the extent practicable, quantifies the
risks to be addressed by the regulation, including risks to
significant subpopulations who are disproportionately
exposed or particularly sensitive;
(2) compares the risks to be addressed to at least three other
risks regulated by EPA or another Federal agency and at
least three other risks not directly regulated by the Federal
Government;
(3) estimates the costs to the U.S. Government, State and
local governments and the private sector of implementing
and complying with the regulation and the benefits of the
5 For example, E.O. 12044, issued by President Carter in 1978 and revoked by
President Reagan in 1981, required agencies to perform Regulatory Impact
Assessments (RIAs) to consider the economic consequences of proposed regulations.
The RIAs were to include a statement of the problem, a description of alternative
ways of alleviating the problem, the economic costs of each alternative proposed, and
the reason for selecting one of the options.
6 Senate-passed S. 2019, § 18.
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regulation, including quantifiable measures and qualitative
measures that are difficult to quantify; and
(4) contains a certification by the Administrator that:
(A) the analyses are based on the best reasonably
obtainable scientific information;
(B) the regulation is likely to significantly reduce the
risks to be addressed;
(C) there is no regulatory alternative that is allowed by
the statute that would achieve an equivalent reduction in risk
in a more cost-effective manner; and
(D) the regulation is likely to produce benefits that will
justify the costs.
A major regulation was defined as "a regulation that the
Administrator determines may have an effect on the economy of $100
million oK more in any one year." As in the original amendment, EPA
was to' report to Congress identifying major regulations for which
complete certification could not be made and summarize reasons. The
amendment to S. 2019 also contained a clause clarifying its effect on
other statutes. This savings clause, however, is broader than the one in S.
171. S. 2019 stated that nothing in the section affected any other
provision of Federal law, delayed action required to meet a deadline
imposed by statute or a court or created any right to judicial or
administrative review. Further, it provided that in the event that a
regulation is subject to judicial or administrative review under another
provision of law, any alleged failure to comply with this section may
not be used as grounds for affecting or invalidating such regulation.
Compared to the amendment to S. 171, that to S. 2019 more
clearly indicated the extent to which risks and benefits should be
quantified. Risks would be quantified "to the extent practicable" while
benefits would be estimated "including both quantifiable measures of
costs and benefits, fo the fullest extent that they can be estimated, and
qualitative measures that are difficult to quantify."
By requiring analyses of proposed as well as final rules, the revised
Johnston amendment provided an opportunity for public comments
before final regulations were to be promulgated, an opportunity not
afforded by S. 171. Analysis of proposed rules in addition to final rules
probably would not increase the burden on EPA (compared to the
6 Risk Health, Safety & Environment I [Witer 1995]

requirements of S. 171), however, because the Johnston provisions in S.
2019 would have applied only to major regulations, and only about
3.6% of the 168 final rules promulgated and 5.9% of the 1,594 rules
proposed by EPA between 1981 and 1992 were major. 7 Also, S. 2019
would have allowed EPA to publish a reference to the published
statement for a proposed major rule in lieu of repeating the statement
for a final major rule if substantially similar to the proposed rule.
S. 2019 would have required risks to be compared to at least six
other risks, whereas the amendment to S. 171 did not specify how
many comparisons would be appropriate. The Johnston amendment to
S. 2019 required EPA to analyze risks to significant subpopulations in
addition to risks to the population as a whole; this provision reflects
concerns about relatively large risks to small groups with higher
exposures or unusual sensitivity to environmental hazards.
Under S. 2019, the Administrator would have been required to
certify that the regulations proposed or promulgated were the most
cost-effective of the alternatives permitted by authorizing statutes. This
allowed EPA to consider unquantifiable, e.g., ethical and
environmental, benefits in addition to economic ones in establishing
goals and standards for environmental quality and human health. In
contrast, S. 171 might be interpreted to have required certification that
costs be justified quantitatively by benefits, for example, by
demonstrating that the regulation would have produced a net benefit.
PresidentReagan's E.as 12291 and 12498
Reagan's E.O. 12291 and E.O. 12498 have both
President
Again,
been revoked. E.O. 12291 on Federal Regulation required all federal
agencies to perform Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) for all proposed
and final "major" rules. 8 It generally defined "major" rules to mean
any regulation likely to have an effect on the national economy of
$100M or more. Rules with a smaller economic impact were also
"major" if they were likely to result in: a major increase in costs or
prices for consumers, individual industries, federal, state, or local
government, or geographic regions; or a significant adverse effect on
7 Ralph A. Luken & Arthur G. Fraas, The U.S. Regulatory Analysis Framework: A
Review, 9 Oxford Rev. Econ. Policy 100, n. 4 (1993).
8 46F.R. 13193 (1981).
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competition, employment, investment, productivity, innovation, or the
ability of U.S.-based enterprises to compete with foreign-based
enterprises in domestic or export markets.
The order reflected that administration's commitment to provide
"regulatory relief," by providing that "to the extent permitted by law,"
"regulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the potential benefits
to society from the regulation outweigh the potential costs." It required
selection of regulatory objectives to maximize net benefits and of the
least cost option for attaining objectives, unless existing laws prevented
this approach. In general, under the Reagan and Bush Administrations,
an RIA required an evaluation of all potential costs and benefits that
would accompany implementation of a rule, including effects that
could not be quantified monetarily. Agencies were required to compare
the costs and benefits of proposed rules to the alternative of no
regulation and other .ways to achieve the same objective at lower
cost. 9 The White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
guidelines for agencies explicitly required analysis of all major
10
alternatives to the proposed rule.
A requirement for risk analysis was not explicit in the 1981 order
but was implied by the mandate to assess net benefits of regulations.
Most benefits are the risks avoided. In January 1985, a second executive
order made the requirement for risk analysis explicit. President
Reagan's E.O. 12498 on the Regulatory Planning Process 1I required
agencies to adopt principles contained in an August 11, 1983 report by
the President's Task Force for Regulatory Relief. One states that
"regulations that seek to reduce health or safety risks should be based
upon scientific risk-assessment procedures, and should address risks
that are real and significant rather than hypothetical or remote."

EPA's Response
EPA published its interpretation of the first Reagan Executive
Order in a 1983 report. 1 2 It describes how the Administration
9

Net benefit is the difference obtained when total costs are subtracted from total

benefits.
10

U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Executive Office of the President

(OMB), Interim Regulatory Impact Analysis Guidance (1981).
11 50 F.R. 1036.
6 Risk Health, Safety & Environment 1 [Winter 1995]

expected directives applicable to all regulatory agencies to be applied in
analyses of environmental regulations controlling individual pollutants
or particular waste streams. 13 The introduction summarizes the
14
requirements for RIA as follows:
Benefits and costs should be quantified and monetized in
the RIA to the extent possible. The RIA should discuss fully
benefits and costs that cannot be quantified and should
assess their importance relative to those that are quantified
or monetized. When many benefits cannot easily be
monetized, or when law requires a specific regulatory
objective, cost-effectiveness analysis may be used to evaluate
regulatory alternatives.
The introduction further states that:
The goal of regulatory impact analysis is to develop and
organize information on benefits, costs, and economic
impacts so as to clarify trade-offs among alternative
regulatory options.
The Guidelines clearly indicate that compliance required risk
analysis of health effects. They also permitted RIAs to vary by the level
of detail, the extent to which costs and benefits were quantified and the
level of precision of information assessed. They allowed variation to
accommodate the nature and quantity of data, available analytic
techniques, resource or time constraints - or the difficulty of analyzing
some environmental problems or regulatory approaches.
12 EPA, Office of Policy Analysis. Guidelines for Performing Regulatory Impact
Analysis. EPA-230-01-84-003. (Dec. 1983).
13 The introduction notes that the Guidelines "are not readily applicable to
regulations for generic information gathering, testing, and procedural rules. In these
situations, program offices should contact EPA's Office of Policy, Planning, and
Evaluation and OMB in the early stages about procedures, extent of detail, and
degree of quantification appropriate for the RIA" (At M3).
14 The cost-effectiveness of a regulation is generally defined as the annual cost
divided by a measure of progress toward the objective. There is no single definition of
the "most cost-effective regulation," but an alternative usually is selected by:
1. choosing the most efficient (least cost) way of achieving the objective;
2. choosing the alternative that maximizes benefits for a particular cost; or
3. comparinhg the relationship between costs and benefits for increasingly
stingenlt regulatory alternatives, and then choosing the regulation that,
relative to more and less strin ~ent regulations, provides a significant
increase in benefits for a reasonable increase in costs. (This metod does
not point to a single best choice but can identify regulations that obtain
relatively tiny increments of protection for human health or the
environment at relatively high costs.) [Id.at M14.]

Schierow: The Johnston Amendments 9

In quantifying potential health effects, EPA guidelines specified
that chemical substances should be evaluated individually based on a
weight-of-evidence scientific evaluation. In addition, the guidelines
required discussion of particularly sensitive populations, the duration,
reversibility, and nature of adverse effects and whether effects resulted
from single or repeated exposures to the substance. They required
estimation of the monetary value of illness avoided by a rule based on
studies of willingness to pay to avoid illness or cost savings such as
health care costs or lost earnings. Finally, they required the value of lives
15
saved by a regulation to be estimated statistically for populations.
The Reagan Administration also required some economic analysis
for regulations that were not major rules, and all rules were sent to
OMB for review. The Guidelines state, "sufficient analysis must be
performed to demonstrate that the rule meets the objectives of the
Executive Order. At a minimum, this should include costs and
economic impact (distributional effects) analyses." 16 However, OMB
routinely waived review of certain categories of rules. For example, they
did not generally require cost-benefit analysis for regulations that
17
revoked requirements (or otherwise "deregulated").
Between 198'1 and 1992, EPA issued 1,686 final rules and 1,594
proposed rules, including 60 major final rules (3.6%) and 92 major
proposed rules (5.9%).18 Formal cost-benefit analyses were prepared
for approximately 80% of the major final rules. The number of costbenefit analyses prepared for nonmajor final and all proposed rules is
unknown. Several final major rules without comprehensive cost-benefit
analyses had court-imposed deadlines for publication (which may have
allowed too little time for a comprehensive analysis), and some other
rules without analyses were withdrawn or returned to EPA by OMB for
19
further analysis.
15 A more detailed discussion of these guidelines may be found in CRS Report 89161 ENR, Health Benefits of Air Pollution Control, in the chapter by Morris A. (Bud)
Ward, at 295.
16 EPA, Guidelines, at M3.
17 Id. (footnote).
18 Luken & Fraas, supra note 7, at 102, n. 4; OMB, Regulatory Program of the
U.S. Government. (various years).
19 Arthur Fraas, The Role of Economic Analysis in Shaping Environmental Policy,
6 Risk. Health, Safety & Environment 1 [Winter 19951

The quality of EPA's cost-benefit analyses for final, major rules was
inconsistent according to reviews by its Office of Policy, Planning and
Evaluation and by Arthur Fraas, an OMB career official. According to
EPA, incomplete analyses were mostly due to inadequate or unavailable
necessary scientific and/or economic data. 20 In other cases, reviewers
have hypothesized that analysis may have suffered from constraints
imposed by statutory and judicial deadlines, lack of resources to hire
additional analysts, and the difficulty of quantifying such benefits as
safe drinking water or clean air and of determining their worth in
monetary terms. 2 1 Moreover, in February 1994, testimony before the
Subcommittee on Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources of the
House Committee on Government Operations, EPA's Assistant
Administrator for Prevention, Pesticides and Toxic Substances testified
that EPA has routinely adjusted the amount of analysis to the relative
22
importance of the potential impact of a rule.
Despite the uneven quality of EPA's analyses, its study concluded
that "EPA's benefit-cost analyses have resulted in several cases of
increased net benefits to society from environmental regulations" and
"analyses yielded a return on investment of 1,000 to 1."23 Between
1981 and 1986, EPA's investment (estimated cost of preparing a formal
analysis for a major rule) ranged from $210,000 to $2,380,000 and
averaged $675,000.24 No figures are available for more recent years or
for the preparation of less comprehensive analyses for rules that were
not "major" rules. In many cases, EPA performed cost-benefit analyses
but statutory provisions limited their use. Between 1981 and 1986,
"EPA was able to consider the full implications of its benefit-cost
25
analyses when setting only 6 of the 15 regulations studied."
in Law and Contemporary Problems, Assessing the Environmental Protection Agency
after TwentyYears: Law, Politics and Economics 118 (1991).

20 EPA, Economic Studies Branch, Office of Policy Analysis. EPA's Use of BenefitCost Analysis 1981-1986 (1987).
21 Fraas, supra note 19, at 120; 0MB, Report on Executive Order No. 12866, 34,

46 (1994).
22 Lynn Goldman, Statement before the Subcommittee on Environment, Energy
and Natural Resources and the Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security
Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, February 1, 1994.
23 EPA, EPA's Use of Benefit-Cost Analysis 1981-1986, at 1 and 2.
24 Ia at 6-5.
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Regulatory Planning and Review in the Clinton Administration
On September 30, 1993, President Clinton signed E.O. 12866 on
Regulatory Planning and Review which revoked and replaced the
Reagan Executive Orders. The new order is similar, but differences are
likely to affect decisions where the Agency has discretion to consider
cost-benefit and risk analyses.
The expressed purpose of President Clinton's order is to improve
the development process for regulations, making it more visible to the
public and more efficient, as well as to ensure the primacy of agencies in
making decisions and the integrity and legitimacy of oversight. In
remarks prior to signing, the President highlighted unprecedented
provisions that, he said, open the regulatory process to scrutiny while
limiting involvement by the President and Vice President. He directed
agencies to confer with OMB and the public during early stages of
deliberations about whether and how to regulate, to record the basis for
regulatory decisions, and to make the records available to the public.
Another stated goal of the Administration is to expedite action. The
early involvement of OMB and others in regulatory planning is
intended to serve this purpose. In contrast, the Reagan orders were
intended to both improve the quality and reduce the number of
regulations - and sought to ensure process oversight. The Johnston
amendments did not disclose their purpose, but would have ensured
that the public and Congress were informed about EPA's estimated
risks, costs and benefits of regulations and that officials have thought
about them. A key difference between the Johnston amendments and
executive orders is that the former would have applied only to EPA,
whereas orders apply to most agencies.
The new order directs agencies to promulgate regulations only
when necessary due to "compelling public need" and after a reasoned
determination that the benefits justify costs, or when required by law.
The Reagan order, as mentioned, permitted regulation only when
benefits exceeded costs, unless this approach was prevented by law. The
Johnston amendments were silent on this question.
25

Id, at 2.
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The Clinton order directs agencies to conduct cost-benefit analysis
for all "significant regulatory actions." The definition of "significant

regulatory action" is more inclusive than the "major rule" definition of
E.O. 12291, indicating that more regulations may be subject to analysis
under the Clinton order. However, OMB will not review rules not
found significant and may not require cost assessments for such rules, as
discussed below. Whether the Johnston amendment to S. 171 would
have been even more inclusive is unclear. It required cost-benefit and
risk analysis of all final regulations, regardless of significance, but did
not address proposed rules, notices of proposed rule making or
advanced notices of proposed rule making - all defined as regulatory
actions under the Clinton order and as rules under the Reagan order
(with the exception of advanced notices of proposed rule making, not
included under the Reagan order). The revised Johnston amendment
would have applied to proposed and final major rules.
President Clinton directs each agency to determine the significance
of proposed regulatory activities initially but authorizes OMB to
designate additional rules as significant (within ten days of receiving an
agency's list of planned actions). It can also waive review of significant
regulatory actions. Under the two previous administrations, it had
similar authority, i.e., to designate rules as major and to waive review of
some major rules. The Johnston amendments did not provide OMB or
EPA discretionary power but recognize that circumstances. may prevent
compliance. In such cases, they would have required EPA to report
reasons for noncompliance in the Federal Register and to Congress.
President Clinton requires agencies to "consider the degree and
nature of the risks posed by various substances or activities within its
jurisdiction" in setting priorities. President Reagan required agencies
instead to maximize net economic benefits. The Johnston amendments
did not mention setting priorities, but EPA would have been required
to publish risk estimates for comparison with the risks addressed.
The Presidential orders direct agencies to use different criteria in
choosing regulatory objectives. Under Reagan, agencies were required
to pursue regulatory objectives that would "maximize net benefits",
that is, achieve the greatest possible economic gain for society. Now,
agencies will select regulatory objectives that address significant
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problems or compelling public need. No weight is given to monetary
considerations. The Johnston amendments were silent on the issue.
Having determined the targets of regulations, The Reagan
Administration simply directed agencies to choose the alternative with
the "least net cost." The Clinton Administration established three
criteria for choosing an approach: maximize net benefits, minimize the
overall regulatory burden for various segments of society, and design
the most cost-effective regulation or alternative to achieve the objective.
However, only one criterion is mentioned in the regulatory philosophy
26
of its order which states:
Further, in choosing among alternative regulatory
approaches, agencies should select those approaches that
maximize net benefits (including potential economic,
environmental, public health and safety, and other
advantages; distributive impacts; and equity), unless a
statute requires another regulatory approach.

Both the Clinton order and Guidelines for Reagan orders require
consideration of alternatives to Federal regulation such as those that
rely on negotiation or economic incentives. Again, the Johnston
amendments did not address this issue.
The Reagan orders required analysis of potential benefits, costs, and
net benefits of the proposed regulation and alternatives that cost less.
Costs, benefits, and net benefits for each alternative were compared to
those for the alternative of no regulation. The Clinton order similarly
requires analysis of all costs and benefits of the proposed regulation and
alternatives, including the alternative of no regulation. It also requires
analysis of net benefits (in order to choose an approach that maximizes
net benefits) and cost-effectiveness of regulatory alternatives. Thus, the
Clinton order appears to have the most comprehensive set of analytic
requirements. The Johnston amendments would require analysis of risks
and relative risks addressed by EPA regulations and the costs and
benefits of regulating. The Johnston amendment to S. 171 could be
interpreted to require calculation of net benefits, whereas the Johnston
amendment to S. 2019 would have required cost-effectiveness analysis
of regulatory alternatives.
26 Section 1(a).
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More specifically, the Reagan orders required analysts to focus on
economic, adverse impacts of regulations (that is, costs) for consumers,
individual industries, federal, state, and local governments, and
geographic regions. The orders required measurement of effects on
competition, employment, investment, productivity, innovation, and
international competitiveness. They also required consideration of the
distribution of costs and benefits - i.e., who pays, and who gains. The
Clinton order also requires analysis of the costs of enforcement and
compliance to governments, regulated entities and the public; impacts
on innovation; and consideration of who pays and who gains. In
addition, the Clinton Administration specifically requires analysis of
benefits to the environment and public health and safety. The
consistency, predictability and flexibility of regulations must be
considered too. Finally, the Clinton order requires consideration of
whether the impacts are fair. The Johnston amendment to S. 171 would
have required analysis of risk to individuals addressed by the regulation,
the health and environmental effects of the regulation, and
implementation and compliance costs. The Johnston amendment to S.
2019 would have required analysis of risks to human health or the
environment to be addressed, including risks to significant
subpopulations disproportionately exposed or particularly sensitive, the
quantitative and qualitative benefits of the regulation, and the costs to
the U.S. Government, State and local governments and the private
sector of implementing and complying with a regulation.
The Clinton order directs agencies to prepare and submit to OMB
an annual Regulatory Plan, in which they identify planned significant
regulatory activities, including a description of how each will reduce
risks. Agencies must compare the magnitude of the risk addressed by
each to the magnitudes of other risks within their jurisdiction.
President Clinton's Order also established a Regulatory Working
Group to serve as a forum for interagency discussions. Topics to be
addressed include comparative risk assessment, innovative regulatory
techniques, and streamlined approaches for small businesses and other
entities to facilitate their compliance with regulations. Interagency
groups also were established under previous administrations, often to
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promote coordination of regulatory activity and harmonization of risk
assessment practices. President Clinton's requirement for comparative
risk analysis is similar to a provision in the Johnston amendments. No
requirement existed in the Reagan orders to compare risks addressed
by regulations, but it did require agencies to submit information about
regulatory actions underway or planned.
The executive orders of Presidents Reagan and Clinton and the
Johnston amendments all require analysis to be based on scientific
information. In addition, the Clinton Administration and Johnston
amendment to S. 2019 require agencies to use "the best reasonably
obtainable technical, economic, and other information." President
Reagan required analysis "based on adequate information" and risk
assessment. The Johnston amendment to S. 171 required evaluation of
risks and use of "the best available scientific data."
The Reagan orders prohibited federal agencies from preempting
state laws or regulations except to protect civil rights or interstate
commerce. The Clinton order requires OMB to meet four times per
year with representatives of state, local and tribal governments to
identify planned and existing regulatory activities with potentially
significant impacts. Several such meetings already have taken place.
Representatives of businesses, nongovernmental organizations, and the
public also must be consulted about the significance of planned
regulatory actions. OMB and the Small Business Administration
sponsored a forum on regulatory reform in March 1994. A second
conference was scheduled for late summer 1994. The Johnston
amendments did not address the role of state, local, or tribal
governments or the private sector in the development of regulations.
EPA' Response to the Clinton Order
EPA submitted its first plan for review of existing significant
regulations on December 29, 1993. The plan describes a broad,
bottom-up process by which Agency managers and the Administrator
will receive nominations for regulations that should be reviewed and
outlines the procedure the agency will follow to designate regulations
for the final list to be included in the annual Regulatory Plan.
According to EPA's plan, EPA program offices will be more directly
6 Risk. Health, Safety & Environment 1 [Winter 1995]

involved in planning with less intercession by the EPA Office of Policy,
Planning and Evaluation than occurred during previous administrations.
OMB issued guidance for agencies April 5, 1994, on how to develop
the regulatory plan. Draft regulatory plans are due at OMB June 1 each
year. The unified plan for the Federal Government will be issued each
fall with the semi-annual regulatory agenda (the list of regulations
agencies expect to issue in the next six months.) The 1994 agenda was
issued November 4, 1994.27
An interagency analytical work group is developing principles of
analysis for use by all agencies and OMB under E.O. 12866. This group
will decide such technical issues as the rate that future costs and benefits
will be discounted to estimate their present value. 2 8 Technical
principles also were developed under the Reagan executive orders.
Agencies also are developing implementation guidelines. The final draft
of EPA's guidelines are expected soon. These internal EPA guidelines
will be reviewed by EPA's SAB and revised, if necessary. The final
report may be released in mid-1995.
OMB reported to the President on progress in implementing the
order in May 1994 and indicated that it had completed reviews for 42
significant EPA rules in the first six months after the order was
published. This included 21 proposed and 21 final rules. For
comparison, between 1981 and 1992, EPA issued 60 major final rules
(3.6 %) and 92 major proposed rules (5.9 %).

27 59 F.R. 57003.
28 The discount rate was 10% under President Reagan and 7% under President
Bush. The discount rate is used to take account of the fact that monetary benefits or
costs realized in the future are worth less than if realized in the present. For example,
at a 10% discount rate, a dollar received one year from now would have a present
value of about $0.91, because if $0.91 were invested now, due to interest earnings at
10%, it will be worth $1.00 in one year.

